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CONSTRUCTION LAW
K Brett Marston *
J. Barrett Lucy **
Since the last survey of this topic published in the fall of 2000,
construction law in Virginia has continued to evolve in an array
of areas involving issues such as claims on surety bonds, claims
against public entities, construction-related products like Exte-
rior Insulation Finishing Systems ("EIFS"), and mechanic's liens.
These changes have implicated and better defined legal principles
including the "no damage for delay" clause on public contracts,
requirements for privity in breach of warranty claims, and im-
plied indemnification.
The significant issues in construction law have arisen both in a
number of significant judicial decisions, mostly from the Supreme
Court of Virginia, and in amendments to statutes by the Virginia
General Assembly. This article will cover most of the significant
judicial decisions and statutory changes since the middle of 2000.
I. ARBITRATION
In the area of "dispute resolution," there continues to be much
litigation concerning arbitrations in construction and other dis-
putes. The issues, which often involve the application of the Uni-
form Arbitration Act in Virginia, Virginia Code sections 8.01-
581.01 to -581.016, revolve around a couple of major themes-
whether a certain dispute is arbitrable and whether a certain ar-
bitration award is enforceable. Although not always strictly con-
struction-related cases, all decisions in this area affect construc-
* Partner, Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, L.L.P., Roanoke, Virginia. B.A., 1990, Uni-
versity of Virginia; J.D., 1993, George Mason University School of Law, with distinction.
** Associate, Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, L.L.P., Roanoke, Virginia. B.A., 1999,
Lynchburg College, cum laude; J.D., 2002, University of Memphis School of Law.
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tion contracting and dispute resolution given the prevalence of
arbitration provisions in construction contracts.
A. Is the Matter Arbitrable?
Virginia courts continue to maintain the trend toward compel-
ling parties to arbitrate in the face of questions about whether
the "arbitration" provision of a contract is applicable to a particu-
lar dispute. For example, in TM Delmarva Power, L.L.C. v. NCP
of Virginia, L.L.C.,' the Supreme Court of Virginia held that,
where the contract provided that either party "may" submit dis-
putes to arbitration, the trial court erred in denying one of the
parties' request to compel arbitration.2 Likewise, in Weitz v. Hud-
son,3 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that an arbitration
provision was broad enough to cover claims related to the conver-
sion of funds and reversed the trial court's ruling denying a mo-
tion to compel arbitration.4 In that case, the arbitration provision
provided that "[a]ny dispute or controversy arising under, out of,
in connection with, or in relation to this Agreement, and any
amendments or proposed amendments hereto, shall be deter-
mined and settled by arbitration in Baltimore, Maryland pursu-
ant to the Rules of the American Arbitration Association then ob-
taining."5
B. Is the Arbitration Award Enforceable?
Another issue that has been subject of much litigation related
to arbitrations is the enforceability of awards issued by arbitra-
tors. Virginia's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides
various, although limited, bases for vacating an arbitration award
in Virginia.6
1. 263 Va. 116, 557 S.E.2d 199 (2002).
2. See id. at 120-23, 557 S.E.2d at 201-02.
3. 262 Va. 224, 546 S.E.2d 732 (2001).
4. See id. at 229, 546 S.E.2d at 735.
5. Id. at 226, 546 S.E.2d at 733.
6. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.010 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2005).
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One such recent case involved a subcontractor that sought
treble damages under Virginia's "business conspiracy" statute' in
an arbitration filed against the contractor that had terminated
the subcontractor from a project and then hired the subcontrac-
tor's employees to work directly for the contractor.' The arbitra-
tors awarded treble damages, and the contractor challenged that
award in circuit court pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-
581.010, claiming that the arbitrators had exceeded their powers
in arbitrating the business conspiracy issue and in applying the
applicable statutes.9 The circuit court found that the arbitration
provision, which stated that "[a]ny dispute arising under or re-
lated to this subcontract with respect to the rights, duties or obli-
gations of the parties"" was broad enough for the arbitrators to
decide the termination issues." The Supreme Court of Virginia
also concluded that there was no basis to vacate the award on the
ground that the arbitrators had disregarded the law in interpret-
ing the business conspiracy statute.
12
II. BONDING/SURETY ISSUES
In the area of bond and surety claims, there have been many
reported decisions. Two of those stand out as significant develop-
ments over the last five years.
A. Actions of Principal and Effect on Surety
The interplay between the actions, or lack thereof, of the prin-
cipal on a surety bond and the liability of the surety itself came to
7. Id. §§ 18.2-499, -500 (Repl. Vol. 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2005).
8. See SIGNAL Corp. v. Keane Fed. Sys., Inc., 265 Va. 38, 43, 574 S.E.2d 253, 255-56
(2003).
9. See id. at 41, 574 S.E.2d at 254.
10. Id. at 45, 574 S.E.2d at 257.
11. See id. at 41, 574 S.E.2d at 254.
12. See id. at 46, 574 S.E.2d at 257; see also Va. Eastern Co. v. N.C. Monroe Constr.
Co., 56 Va. Cir. 220, 226-29 (Cir. Ct. 2001) (Salem City) (denying a motion to vacate an
arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrators ruled in contravention of Virginia law,
and in which the court thoroughly examined the arguments for and against this ground to
vacate); cf. E.J. Miller Constr. Co. v. Holt, 56 Va. Cir. 153, 154 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Roanoke
City) (concluding that an arbitrator exceeded his authority in awarding "delay" damages
under the construction contract and amending the contractor's award).
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the forefront in the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in
American Safety Casualty Insurance Co. v. C.G. Mitchell Con-
struction, Inc. 3 There, the surety was held to be liable for a de-
fault judgment against the principal (a subcontractor) by a claim-
ant (the general contractor) on a payment bond claim.14 The
default judgment resulted from a corporate designee for the prin-
cipal failing to appear at a corporate deposition after receiving
proper notice." The surety, although it had power-of-attorney
rights under an indemnity agreement with the subcontractor, re-
ceived the notice of the deposition, and had an opportunity to des-
ignate a corporate representative, did not act to designate anyone
for that corporate deposition. 6 Thus, the surety was liable for the
default judgment held by the general contractor against the sub-
contractor. 17
B. Choice of Bonds to Pursue
Another decision that caused waves in the surety field was is-
sued by the Chesapeake City Circuit Court in 2000 in Crofton
Construction Services, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co.'8 In that
case, both the general contractor and the subcontractor had pro-
cured a payment bond for the project in which they were in-
volved.' 9 A sub-subcontractor that had not been paid by the sub-
contractor brought a claim against the general contractor's
payment bond only.20 The general contractor's surety challenged
the claim on the grounds that the claimant was required instead
to proceed against the subcontractor's payment bond.21 Reading
the language of the general contractor's payment bond, the circuit
court concluded that "on its face" it included the sub-
subcontractor within the definition of "claimant" and that there
13. 268 Va. 340, 601 S.E.2d 633 (2004).
14. See id. at 343, 601 S.E.2d at 634.
15. See id. at 346, 601 S.E.2d at 636.
16. See id. at 348, 601 S.E.2d at 637.
17. Id. at 353, 601 S.E.2d at 640-41; see also Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Auto-Owners
Ins. Co., 53 Va. Cir. 192, 196 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Arlington County) (holding that the surety
was collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of liability where a default judgment
had been entered against the principal).
18. No. 99-1204 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Chesapeake City).
19. Id. at 1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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was no limitation within the Virginia Code prohibiting the sub-
subcontractor from choosing which of the two bonds against
which it would proceed.22
III. BUILDING CODE
A. Adoption of New Uniform Statewide Building Code
Effective October 1, 2003, Virginia's Board of Housing and
Community Development adopted and incorporated the codes of
the International Code Council, Inc. as the underlying basis for
Virginia's Uniform Statewide Building Code ("USBC"), replacing
the Building Officials and Code Administrators International Inc.
("BOCA"). 23 This change was spawned by a change in Virginia
Code section 36-99(B), in 2002, whereby the General Assembly
directed the Board for Housing and Community Development to
give regard to standards established by, among others, the Inter-
national Code Council and the National Fire Protection Associa-
tion.24
B. Judicial Decision
The Court of Appeals of Virginia addressed the enforcement of
the USBC in a recent decision. In Avalon Assisted Living Facili-
22. Id. at 2. Note also that in 2003, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code sec-
tion 2.2-4341(B) ("Actions on payment bonds") to remove language that appears to have
been superfluous based upon the circuit court's analysis in Crofton. See Act of Mar. 16,
2003, ch. 255, 2003 Va. Acts 277 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4341(B)
(Repl. Vol. 2005)). Prior to deletion, the second sentence formerly read "[a]ny claimant who
has a direct contractual relationship with a subcontractor from whom the contractor has
required a subcontractor payment bond under subsection F of § 2.2-4337 but who has no
contractual relationship, express or implied, with such contractor, may bring an action on
the subcontractor's payment bond." See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4341(B) (Cum. Supp. 2003).
The deleted language had ostensibly, until the Crofton decision, suggested to many practi-
tioners that, if the subcontractor had procured a bond, the sub-subcontractor would need
to proceed only against that subcontractor's payment bond, but neither the statute nor
that specific language contained any limitation for the claimant to seek relief just on that
bond.
23. See 13 VA. ADMIN CODE § 5-62 (2005) (promulgating the Uniform Statewide Build-
ing Code, based upon authority set forth in Virginia Code section 36-99).
24. See Act of Apr. 5, 2002, ch. 555, 2002 Va. Acts 742 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 36-99(B) (Repl. Vol. 2005)).
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ties, Inc. v. Zager,25 the court faced the issue of whether the State
Building Code Technical Review Board ("TRB"), which is the next
level of administrative review after decisions of local appeals
boards, had the authority to modify the USBC's "use group classi-
fications" for an Alzheimer's housing facility.26 The court held
that the TRB lacked the authority under Virginia's statutory and
regulatory structure because
[t]o the extent the Housing Board purported to authorize the local of-
ficial-and the local appeals board and TRB via the appeals proc-
ess-to grant modification to any of the provisions of the USBC, that
regulation exceeds the Housing Board's statutory authority and con-
stitutes a clear abuse of delegated discretion.27
IV. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
The beginning of this decade has been a busy time for cases
and legislation related to construction for public entities in Vir-
ginia and for statutes establishing the framework for the pro-
curement and contracting of those projects.
A. The Upper Occoquan Sewage Authority Cases
Two of the most notable decisions related to contracts and
claims on public projects arose from a single controversy involv-
ing a public authority ("the Authority") and a general contractor
(the "General Contractor") regarding the construction of a waste-
water treatment facility in Fairfax County. 2 The General Con-
tractor asserted multiple claims against the Authority, which was
a public entity subject to the Virginia Public Procurement Act
("VPPA"), Virginia Code sections 2.2-4300 to -4377.29
The case has a detailed procedural history, but, in general
terms, the General Contractor submitted certain claims for addi-
25. 39 Va. App. 484, 574 S.E.2d 298 (Ct. App. 2002).
26. Id. at 489, 574 S.E.2d at 300.
27. Id. at 502, 574 S.E.2d at 306 (emphasis in original).
28. See Blake Constr. Co. v. Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth., 266 Va. 564, 568-69, 587
S.E.2d 711, 713-14 (2003); Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth. v. Blake Constr. Co., 266 Va.
582, 584-85, 587 S.E.2d 721, 722 (2003).
29. See Blake Constr., 266 Va. at 569, 587 S.E.2d at 713-14; Upper Occoquan, 266 Va.
at 584-85, 587 S.E.2d at 722-23.
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tional compensation and time to the Authority for consideration
related to the scope and timing of completion of the work, and to a
large extent, those claims were denied.3 ° From there, the General
Contractor filed several suits in circuit court challenging those
adverse rulings and seeking a declaration from the court that
parts of its contract with the Authority violated Virginia Code
section 2.2-4335(A) and were void as against public policy.31 The
circuit court, through pre-trial proceedings and a trial on certain
pleas in bar of the Authority, issued rulings to which both parties
objected, resulting in appeals from both.32 The disputes came to a
head with two opinions from the Supreme Court of Virginia is-
sued in October 2003.33
These two decisions addressed a number of common issues that
arise in claims related to public construction projects, including
the scope and enforceability of "no damage for delay" provisions
in Virginia public contracts and requirements for providing notice
to the owner of claims for changes in the work.
1. Scope of the "No Damage for Delay" Prohibition in Public
Contracts Under Virginia Code Section 2.2-4335(A)
The General Contractor asserted that its contract with the Au-
thority ran afoul of Virginia Code section 2.2-4335(A).34 This sec-
tion, in pertinent part, prohibits:
Any provision... [of a public construction] contract that purports to
waive, release, or extinguish the rights of a contractor to recover
costs or damages for unreasonable delay ... if and to the extent the
delay is caused by acts or omissions of the public body, its agents or
employees and due to causes within their control ....
A provision within the contract at issue provided that the Gen-
eral Contractor could obtain "direct costs proximately and fore-
30. See Blake Constr., 266 Va. at 569, 587 S.E.2d at 714; Upper Occoquan, 266 Va. at
585, 587 S.E.2d at 722.
31. See Blake Constr., 266 Va. at 569, 587 S.E.2d at 714; Upper Occoquan, 266 Va. at
585, 587 S.E.2d at 722-23.
32. See Blake Constr., 266 Va. at 570, 587 S.E.2d at 714; Upper Occoquan, 266 Va. at
586-87, 587 S.E.2d at 723.
33. See Blake Constr., 266 Va. 564, 587 S.E.2d 711; Upper Occoquan, 266 Va. 582, 587
S.E.2d 721.
34. See Blake Constr., 266 Va. at 568, 572, 587 S.E.2d at 713, 715-16.
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4335(A) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
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seeably resulting from unreasonable delay caused by the Owner
or the Engineer due to causes within their control."36 The con-
tract, however, went on to define "unreasonable delay" in a man-
ner that the General Contractor asserted violated Virginia Code
section 2.2-4335(A), including limiting recovery of costs to cir-
cumstances where the Authority exercised "bad faith, malice,
gross negligence or abandonment" of the contract.37 The Authority
asserted that as long as the parties did not contract to fully extin-
guish all monetary relief for the contractor who was victim to
some type of unreasonable delay, then no violation of the statu-
tory prohibition occurred.38
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with the Authority.39
Taking the General Contractor's allegations as true in reviewing
the trial court's ruling in favor of the Authority's demurrer on
this issue, the court held that the General Assembly's use of the
word "any" in its prohibition of "no damages for delay" provisions
was "instructive and mandatory," and that "[i]f an expansion or
construction of the blanket prohibition found in Code § 2.2-
4335(A) is to be created, that authority must come from the Gen-
eral Assembly and not the parties or the judiciary. "40 The court
concluded that:
In the context of a contract under the VPPA, unreasonable delay
damages are to be determined by the court under the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. Contract limitations on the contractor's
right to damages for unreasonable delay are thus forbidden except to
the extent enumerated by the General Assembly under Code § 2.2-
4335(B) or other specific statutory enactment. 41
2. The Authority's Application for "Costs" Under Virginia Code
Section 2.2-4335(C)
Part of the Authority's appeal was in response to the circuit
court's denial of its application for the costs incurred in defending
against certain claims by the General Contractor, under Virginia
36. Blake Constr., 266 Va. at 573, 587 S.E.2d at 716.
37. Id. at 574, 587 S.E.2d at 716-17.
38. Id. at 575, 587 S.E.2d at 717.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 576, 587 S.E.2d at 717-18.
41. Id. at 577, 587 S.E.2d at 718.
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Code section 2.2-4335(C).42 In particular, the Authority asserted
that a claim that the General Contractor had brought for "mate-
rial breach" (a claim that the Authority believed the circuit court
had dismissed as a result of pre-trial challenge by the Authority)
was actually one for "delay damages" and, therefore, the Author-
ity should be entitled to its costs expended in defending against
it. 43 Virginia Code section 2.2-4335(C) provides that:
A contractor making a claim against a public body for costs or dam-
ages due to the alleged delaying of the contractor in the performance
of its work under any public construction contract shall be liable to
the public body and shall pay it for a percentage of all costs incurred
by the public body in investigating, analyzing, negotiating, litigating
and arbitrating the claim, which percentage shall be equal to the
percentage of the contractor's total delay claim that is determined
through litigation or arbitration to be false or to have no basis in law
or in fact.
44
The Supreme Court of Virginia denied the Authority's argu-
ment based upon there not being any order in the record provid-
ing that the "material breach" claim actually had been dismissed,
even though there were some "on the record" statements by the
circuit court judge to that effect.45 Thus, those claims, in the eyes
of the court, were within a group of claims that had been non-
suited by the General Contractor and on which there had been no
ruling on the merits.46
3. Notice Provisions Related to Decrease in Contract Amount for
Work Deleted by Owner
On another issue, the circuit court granted the Authority's plea
in bar which resulted in the dismissal of certain claims of the
General Contractor arising from the Authority's unilateral re-
moval of work from the contract and its associated reduction in
contract amount.47 The General Contractor argued that, because
there was no specific provision within the contract addressing
such claims, no notice was required by it to preserve its rights to
42. See Upper Occoquan, 266 Va. at 587, 587 S.E.2d at 723.
43. Id. at 588, 587 S.E.2d at 724.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4335(C) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
45. See Upper Occoquan, 266 Va. at 588-89, 587 S.E.2d at 724-25.
46. Id. at 589, 587 S.E.2d at 725.
47. See Blake Constr., 266 Va. at 578, 587 S.E.2d at 719.
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challenge those reduction amounts.' The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia disagreed and ruled that the Authority's actions "had the ef-
fect of converting the [General Contractor's] claim into one for
additional funds," which was subject to a specific notice require-
ment within the contract.49
B. Notice of Claims: The Bland County Service Authority Case
The Supreme Court of Virginia also addressed the issue of "no-
tice" in the context of a contract under the VPPA in Welding, Inc.
v. Bland County Service Authority.5" In this instance, the comple-
tion of the project was delayed, and the owner, the Bland County
Service Authority ("the Authority"), withheld funds from the con-
tractor as liquidated damages.5' The contractor originally filed
the case in federal court in West Virginia. 2 After the federal
court dismissed the case, the contractor re-filed in a Virginia cir-
cuit court.53 The circuit court dismissed the contractor's case on
demurrer due to issues with timeliness of filing suit and because
the amended motion for judgment did not reflect that the contrac-
tor had ever given the Authority written notice of its intention to
file a claim.54
The contractor's amended motion for judgment stated that the
Authority had prior written notice of the contractor's intention to
file a claim and, according to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the
pleading cited "portions of the written minutes of a progress
meeting."55 The pleading did not assert that they constituted
"written notice."56
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that, for purposes of the
demurrer, the amended motion for judgment sufficiently stated
that notice had been provided, and that whether the notice provi-
sions of the VPAA had been met was a "determination to be made
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 261 Va. 218, 222-23, 541 S.E.2d 909, 911 (2001).
51. Id. at 222, 541 S.E.2d at 911.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 227, 541 S.E.2d at 914.
56. Id.
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at trial."57 In summing up its reversal of the circuit court's dis-
missal of the contractor's amended motion for judgment on three
notice-related points, the court stated that "the dispute here in-
volves interpretation of the various contract provisions and appli-
cation of the construed contract to the facts of this case. That is a
matter for trial. As we have said, resolution of such issues is not
appropriate for determination on demurrer."58
C. Oral Agreements with Public Entities
In King George County Service Authority v. Presidential Service
Co. Tier II," the Supreme Court of Virginia confronted the issue
of whether a contract entered into by the King George County
Service Authority was enforceable." The court concluded that
there was not sufficient authority in the Authority's records al-
lowing it or its general manager to enter into the contract to pur-
chase a privately owned utility system.6' The court "reiterated
'that those who deal with public officials must, at their peril, take
cognizance of their power and its limits."'62 The court, however,
concluded that there was sufficient authority in the records for
the Authority to enter into a letter agreement to purchase the
system, and thus the subsequent contract was lawful and en-
forceable."
57. Id.
58. Id. at 229, 541 S.E.2d at 915. The Supreme Court of Virginia in Welding, Inc. also
addressed a procedural issue as to whether the tolling provision of Virginia Code section
8.01-229(E)(1) would invalidate the time limitations of the VPPA (previous Virginia Code
sections 11-69(D) and -70(E)), where a suit was brought and then voluntarily dismissed
and brought again at a time outside of those VPPA provisions. Id. at 224-25, 541 S.E.2d
at 912-13. The court concluded that the two statutes were intended to "address separate
matters," and that the VPPA provisions were "not specific statutes which take precedence
over the general tolling provision of Code § 8.01-229(E)(1)." Id. at 225, 541 S.E.2d at 912.
The court also rejected the argument that Virginia Code section 11-69(D) was a statute of
repose that could not be tolled. Id. at 225-26, 541 S.E.2d at 913.
59. 267 Va. 448, 593 S.E.2d 241 (2004).
60. See id. at 454, 593 S.E.2d at 241-42.
61. See id. at 455-56, 593 S.E.2d at 245.
62. Id. at 454, 593 S.E.2d at 244 (quoting County of York v. King's Villa, Inc., 226 Va.
447, 450, 309 S.E.2d 332, 334 (1983)).
63. See id. at 456, 593 S.E.2d at 245.
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D. Significant Statutory Changes
1. Recodification of VPPA
Effective October 1, 2001, the General Assembly re-codified the
VPPA by moving it from Title 11 of the Virginia Code to Title
2.2.64
2. Government's Bad Faith Denial of Claims
In 2001, the General Assembly added a provision to Virginia
Code section 2.2-4335, which provides a corollary to the provision
discussed in the Upper Occoquan case above concerning pay-
ments for the costs the government expends defending against
meritless claims.65 This new provision, which is codified at Vir-
ginia Code section 2.2-4335(D), provides that:
A public body denying a contractor's claim for costs or damages due
to the alleged delaying of the contractor in the performance of work
under any public construction contract shall be liable to and shall
pay such contractor a percentage of all costs incurred by the contrac-
tor to investigate, analyze, negotiate, litigate and arbitrate the
claim. The percentage paid by the public body shall be equal to the
percentage of the contractor's total delay claim for which the public
body's denial is determined through litigation or arbitration to have
been made in bad faith.66
3. Public-Private Education Facilities and Infrastructure Act of
2002
In 2002, the General Assembly added an alternative method by
which localities can procure the construction of educational and
other public facilities when it adopted the Public-Private Educa-
tion Facilities and Infrastructure Act of 2002 ("PPEA").67 Similar
64. Act of Apr. 5, 2001, ch. 844, 2001 Va. Acts 1428 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.2-4300 to -4366 (Repl. Vol. 2005)).
65. Act of Apr. 5, 2001, ch. 324, 2001 Va. Acts 285 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-4335(D) (Repl. Vol. 2005)); see supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4335(D) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
67. See Act of Apr. 6, 2002, ch. 571, 2002 Va. Acts 770 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
56-575.1 to -575.16 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2005)).
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to the Public-Private Transportation Act enacted in the 1990s,
the PPEA "[aluthorizes private entities to acquire, design, con-
struct, improve, renovate, expand, equip, maintain or operate
qualifying projects after obtaining approval of a public entity that
has the power to take such actions with respect to such pro-
jects."68
V. CONTRACTS
The Supreme Court of Virginia has addressed one common-
place problem with construction contracts-the effect when a con-
tract is not signed by one of the parties.69 In G&M Homes II, Inc.
v. Pearson, the court held that a contract not signed by the
"seller" was incomplete and unenforceable.7" The contract pro-
vided two signature lines for the "seller," which was comprised of
two different individuals."' The second individual "seller" never
signed the contract.72 The court thus upheld the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of the "seller" denying the pur-
chaser's request for specific performance.73
VI. FRAUD IN CONSTRUCTION
A. Statement About Future Performance /False Advertisement
An ever-increasing type of allegation in construction cases re-
lates to fraud or false advertising regarding the quality or nature
of products, such as the Exterior Insulation Finishing Systems
("EIFS") or "synthetic stucco" that are used in construction. The
Supreme Court of Virginia addressed such a situation in McMil-
lion v. Dryvit Systems, Inc.74 As to the fraud claim, the court held
that statements about the future performance, as opposed to pre-
sent or pre-existing qualities, of a good are not actionable as
68. S.B. 681, Va. Gen. Assembly, Summary as passed (Reg. Sess. 2002).
69. See G&M Homes I, Inc. v. Pearson, 263 Va. 107, 109, 556 S.E.2d 743, 744 (2002).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 110, 556 S.E.2d at 745.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 115, 556 S.E.2d at 748.
74. 262 Va. 463, 552 S.E.2d 364 (2001).
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fraud.75 The court concluded that a misrepresentation must be of
an existing fact and not the mere expression of an opinion, which,
however strong and positive the language may be, is not fraud.76
Whether the statements concerned an "existing fact" is to be de-
termined by interpreting all of the surrounding circumstances
and is not subject to a bright line test.77
B. Criminal Aspects
As seen in a recent Supreme Court of Virginia decision, fraud
in construction can have criminal ramifications." Holsapple v.
Commonwealth involved the application of Virginia Code section
18.2-200.1, which makes it a larceny to accept money for con-
struction services yet fail to perform or return the advanced funds
"within fifteen days of a request to do so sent by certified mail, re-
turn receipt requested, to his last known address or to the ad-
dress listed in the contract."79
The debate in Holsapple focused on whether the Common-
wealth had proven that there was sufficient notice to the defen-
dant contractor.80 The defendant argued that "actual receipt" of
the notice must be proven. 1 The Supreme Court of Virginia held
that it was sufficient evidence of "notice" that it was "sent by cer-
tified mail, return receipt requested." 2 Thus, the conviction was
upheld. 3
C. Fraud Against Taxpayers Act
A recent legislative enactment that does not directly implicate
the construction industry, but which has significant ramifications
for those working on projects where the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia is the distributor of funds, is the Fraud Against Taxpayers
75. See id. at 472, 552 S.E.2d at 369.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 471, 552 S.E.2d at 369.
78. See Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 587 S.E.2d 561 (2003).
79. See id. at 595, 587 S.E.2d at 562.
80. See id. at 598-99, 587 S.E.2d at 564-65.
81. Id. at 599, 587 S.E.2d at 564.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 604, 587 S.E.2d 567.
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Act ("FATA"), which went into effect on January 1, 2003, and is
codified at Virginia Code sections 8.01-216.1 to -216.19.84 Under
FATA, there are various acts that can lead to civil penalty, in-
cluding presenting a false or fraudulent claim for payment or tak-
ing steps to get such a false or fraudulent claim paid by the
Commonwealth. 5
VII. GOODS/IMPLIED WARRANTY CLAIMS
A. Privity Issues and Consequential Versus Direct Damages
The Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Beard Plumbing &
Heating, Inc. v. Thompson Plastics, Inc. 6 left unanswered ques-
tions about the interplay of the anti-privity statute within Vir-
ginia's version of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), Virginia
Code section 8.2-318, and the recovery of consequential damages
for breach of implied warranties provided for by the UCC under
Virginia Code section 8.2-715."7 In Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex,
Inc.,88 the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified that where the
damages for breach of implied warranty of merchantability are
"consequential," privity is required. 9
In Pulte Home Corp., the home builder settled claims with the
home purchaser related to the use of an EIFS product on a new
home.9" The builder sought recovery against the manufacturer of
the EIFS product with whom it did not have privity, there being
an intervening distributor in the chain of sale.91 The circuit court
sustained the defendant's demurrer on the basis that the dam-
ages being sought were consequential and were not recoverable in
the absence of privity, as either consequential or direct damages
required privity for recovery under Virginia Code section 8.2-
715.92
84. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-216.1 to -216.19 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
85. See id. § 8.01-216.3 (Cum. Supp. 2005).
86. 254 Va. 240, 491 S.E.2d 731 (1997).
87. See Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 265 Va. 518, 524-26, 579 S.E.2d 188, 191-92
(2003).
88. 265 Va. 518, 579 S.E.2d 188.
89. Id. at 527-28, 579 S.E.2d at 192-93.
90. Id. at 522 & n.4, 579 S.E.2d at 190 & n.4.
91. See id. at 521, 579 S.E.2d at 189.
92. See id. at 524, 579 S.E.2d at 191.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the dismissal, conclud-
ing that the trial court had found the damages to be "consequen-
tial"-a ruling made as a matter of law.9 3 Given the intervening
event-the builder's liability to the homeowner-the court con-
cluded that the damages being sought were "consequential," and
privity was required for recovery.94
VIII. INDEMNIFICATION
Pulte Home Corp. also addressed an issue that has been raised
increasingly in construction cases, that being the status of im-
plied and equitable indemnification under Virginia law.95 The
Supreme Court of Virginia clarified that, in order for a party,
such as the home builder in that case, to recover against another
party on the theory of "implied indemnity," there must first be a
"contractual relationship" between the parties.9" Such a relation-
ship did not exist in that case between the builder and product
manufacturer, and thus the court affirmed the dismissal of the
implied indemnity claim.97
Likewise, the court affirmed the dismissal of the home builder's
claim for "equitable indemnification" because there had been no
"previous determination" that the manufacturer was negligent.98
In order for such a claim to survive, there must have been active
negligence on the part of the defendant and passive negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, both resulting in the harm to a particular
third-party to whom the passive tortfeasor was liable.99
IX. LICENSING
Another prevalent issue in construction cases during the first
part of this decade has been that of the status of the contractor's
license with the Contractor's Board of the Virginia Department of
93. Id. at 526, 579 S.E.2d at 192.
94. Id. at 527-28, 579 S.E.2d at 192-93.
95. Id. at 528-29, 579 S.E.2d at 193.
96. Id. at 528, 579 S.E.2d at 193.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 528-29, 579 S.E.2d at 193.
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Professional and Occupational Regulation ("DPOR"). As these is-
sues have arisen more, the General Assembly has been called
upon to modify certain portions of Title 54.1 relating to contractor
licensing.100 As a result, there have been several changes to the
Virginia Code related to contractor licensing in the last several
years:
1. In 2005, the General Assembly modified Virginia Code sec-
tion 54.1-1100 to raise the limits for a Class B license for a single
contract from $70,000 to $120,000, and the twelve-month cap
from $500,000 to $750,000.101
2. In 2005, the General Assembly raised the maximum amount
of a single claim against the Contractor's Recovery Fund from
$10,000 to $20,000.102
3. In 2004, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code sec-
tion 54.1-1115 to impose daily sanctions for anyone doing work
without the proper license classification for such work.
0 3
4. In 2003, the General Assembly clarified the language of Vir-
ginia Code section 54.1-1115(C) to state that:
No person shall be entitled to assert the lack of licensure or certifica-
tion as required by this chapter as a defense to any action at law or
suit in equity if the party who seeks to recover from such person
gives substantial performance within the terms of the contract in
good faith and without actual knowledge that a license or certificate
was required by this chapter to perform the work for which he seeks to
recover payment. 104
The emphasized portion of that statute replaced language that
stated that the actual knowledge had to be "of the licensure or
certification requirements of this chapter." l0 5
100. See generally REPORT OF THE DEPT OF PROF'L AND OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION ON
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PILOT PROGRAM FOR LOCAL ASSISTANCE WITH THE
INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FINAL DISCIPLINARY ORDERS
OF THE BOARD OF CONTRACTORS, S. Doc. No. 16 (2004).
101. Act of Mar. 21, 2005, ch. 348, 2005 Va. Acts 454 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-1100 (Repl. Vol. 2005)).
102. Act of Mar. 20, 2005, ch. 252, 2005 Va. Acts 339 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-1123(A) (Repl. Vol. 2005)).
103. Act of Mar. 15, 2004, ch. 131, 2004 Va. Acts 201 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-1115(B) (Repl. Vol. 2005)).
104. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 429, 2003 Va. Acts 539 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-1115(C) (Repl. Vol. 2005) (emphasis added)).
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-1115(C) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
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X. MECHANIC'S LIENS
A. Judicial Decisions
Practitioners who file mechanic's liens became more concerned
about the "150-day" rule under Virginia Code section 43-4 after
the Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling in Carolina Builders Corp.
v. Cenit Equity Co. °6 In that decision, the court affirmed the dis-
missal of a memorandum of mechanic's lien in its entirety be-
cause some of the amounts being claimed were incurred prior to
the 150-day window provided for by Virginia Code section 43-4.17
In a more recent decision in Reliable Constructors, Inc. v. CFJ
Properties,08 however, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
the circuit court, under Virginia Code section 43-15, must allow
the mechanic's lien claimant the opportunity to present evidence
that the inclusion of amounts prior to the 150-day limit was an
error.' °9 Without citing the Carolina Builders decision, the court
declined to dismiss the bill of complaint to enforce the memoran-
dum of mechanic's lien where the claimant, a subcontractor, had
included a $250 fine it incurred for an OSHA citation within the
amounts being claimed in its memorandum of mechanic's lien.11°
The circuit court had dismissed the entire lien under Carolina
Builders, refusing the claimant's argument that it was a mere
"clerical error" that could be corrected under Virginia Code sec-
tion 43-15."'
The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the claimant
should be provided with an opportunity to present evidence that
it was a mere inaccuracy and not a willful attempt to include
amounts that were in violation of Title 43.112 Thus, the court re-
versed and remanded the case to the circuit court for determina-
tion of the applicability of Virginia Code section 43-15."'
106. 257 Va. 405, 512 S.E.2d 550 (1999).
107. Id. at 412, 512 S.E.2d at 553.
108. 263 Va. 279, 559 S.E.2d 681 (2002).
109. Id. at 281-82, 559 S.E.2d at 682-83.
110. See id. at 280-82, 559 S.E.2d at 682-83.
111. Id. at 281, 559 S.E.2d at 682.
112. See id. at 282, 559 S.E.2d at 682-83.
113. Id., 559 S.E.2d at 683.
[Vol. 40:143
CONSTRUCTION LAW
B. Mechanic's Lien Legislation
The General Assembly has made several modifications to the
mechanic's lien statutes within Title 43 in recent years:
1. In 2003, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code sec-
tion 43-4 to require a mechanic's lien claimant who is the "gen-
eral contractor" to file, along with its memorandum of mechanic's
lien, a certification that it has mailed a copy of the memorandum
of mechanic's lien to the owner's last known address. 14
2. In 2002, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code sec-
tion 43-11 to require that a second notice of the actual amount of
the subcontractor's or supplier's claim for payment due be given
to the owner in order for the owner to be made personally liable
to the subcontractor or supplier.115
3. In 2002, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code sec-
tion 43-3 to clarify that a lien claimant can include reasonable
rental and use value of equipment when it calculates the amount
of its labor and materials." 6
XI. NEW HOME WARRANTY
Following the Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling in Vaughn,
Inc. v. Beck," 7 the General Assembly, in 2002, amended Virginia's
warranty statute for the sale of new homes, Virginia Code section
55-70.1.1" In Vaughn, the Supreme Court of Virginia had read
Virginia Code section 55-70.1 not to have a requirement that the
homeowner provide written notice of the breach of warranty
within one year after the homeowner took title or possession." 9
The 2002 legislative amendment to the statute provides that such
114. Act of Mar. 19, 2003, ch. 698, 2003 Va. Acts 931 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 43-4 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
115. Act of Apr. 7, 2002, ch. 772, 2002 Va. Acts 1285 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 43-11 (Repl. Vol. 2002)).
116. Act of Apr. 1, 2002, ch. 273, 2002 Va. Acts 351 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 43-3 (Cum. Supp. 2005)).
117. 262 Va. 673, 554 S.E.2d 88 (2001).
118. See Act of Apr. 8, 2002, ch. 795, 2002 Va. Acts 1324 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-70.1 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2005)).
119. 262 Va. at 678-80, 554 S.E.2d at 90-91.
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written notice within the one-year window is a prerequisite to re-
covery on the statutory warranty. 12
0
XII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. False Advertising
In Parker-Smith v. Sto Corp., 1 the Supreme Court of Virginia,
in a claim related to the sale of an allegedly defective EIFS prod-
uct, held that the catch-all statute of limitations of Virginia Code
section 8.01-248 applied to a claim for false advertising. 122 Thus,
the court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the claim because it
was filed too late.123
B. Enforcement of OSHA Citations in Virginia
The enforcement of citations within the Virginia Department of
Labor and Industry's ("DOLI") enforcement of the occupational
safety and health laws is an issue that impacts the construction
industry greatly. The time limit, if any, for the Commonwealth to
file a bill of complaint to enforce a citation that it has previously
issued was an issue in Barr v. S. W. Rodgers Co. '24
In Barr, the contractor challenged the fifteen-month delay from
the date it filed its notice of contest to the date that the commis-
sioner of DOLI filed its bill of complaint to enforce the citation. 2 '
The Court of Appeals of Virginia refused to dismiss the bill of
complaint for being filed too late.'26 The court did recognize, how-
ever, that there was not an unlimited amount of time for the
commissioner to file under Virginia Code section 40.1-49.4. 127
120. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2005).
121. 262 Va. 432, 551 S.E.2d 615 (2001).
122. Id. at 434, 551 S.E.2d at 616.
123. See id.
124. 34 Va. App. 50, 57, 537 S.E.2d 620, 623 (Ct. App. 2000).
125. Id. at 56-57, 537 S.E.2d at 623.
126. Id. at 58, 537 S.E.2d at 624.
127. Id. Subsequently, there have been several circuit court decisions further exploring
this issue. Two reported decisions have refused to dismiss bills of complaint. See Daven-
port v. English Constr. Co., 66 Va. Cir. 77, 80-82 (Cir. Ct. 2004) (Roanoke City) (allowing a
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XIII. CONCLUSION
As is apparent from this survey, construction law covers an ar-
ray of different legal topics from indemnity to contractor licensing
and from mechanic's liens to claims on public construction con-
tracts. During the first five years of this decade, the courts and
the legislature have continued to face challenging new issues and
the application of old principles in new settings. While many dis-
putes in the construction arena are being resolved through alter-
native measures such as mediation and arbitration, it is apparent
through decisions such as Pulte Home Corp., American Safety
Casualty Insurance, and the Upper Occoquan Sewage Authority
cases that the courts of the Commonwealth will continue to face
challenging and interesting construction disputes and will be
asked to define the respective rights of the variety of players in
the construction business. Likewise, with legislation related to
the PPEA, contractor licensing, and mechanic's lien claims, it is
apparent that the General Assembly will also be asked to define
and refine the parameters of the many statutes that impact the
construction business.
thirty-four month delay in filing enforcement action); Davenport v. Thor, Inc., 62 Va. Cir.
237, 238 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Montgomery County) (allowing a thirty-three month delay in fil-
ing enforcement action). In one reported decision, however, a circuit court did dismiss the
bill of complaint. See Davenport v. Thor, Inc., 62 Va. Cir. 228, 230 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Mar-
tinsville City) (ruling that a forty-month delay in filing enforcement action was unreason-
able).
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